A key member of Congress said that an imminent move by Iran to possess nuclear weapons poses "increasing danger" to the United States, but didn’t mention deploying missile defense systems to counter that danger.

Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), who chairs the House Armed Services Committee strategic forces subcommittee, was asked by Space & Missile Defense Report what options the United States has as it confronts a nuclear-armed Iran, specifically to prevent Iran from engaging in nuclear blackmail.

Tauscher, in her response, recommended further talks with Iran such as President-elect Obama has proposed, plus strategic nuclear weapons controls, inspections and more — but she didn’t mention a missile defense shield such as the proposed European Missile Defense (EMD) system. Tauscher’s subcommittee oversees missile defense programs, including EMD.

She spoke at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit at a hotel in Washington, D.C.

She was asked if the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, estimate that Iran already has enough fissile material for a bomb means it now is too late to prevent Iran from obtaining atomic weapons, and "and if so … what can we do, what are our options, or do we have any options to counter a nuclear Iran? Is there any way to prevent them from practicing nuclear blackmail against Europe and the U.S.?"

Tauscher provided a lengthy response that didn’t mention missile defense. Her subcommittee oversees the EMD program that would include a radar that the United States would install in the Czech Republic, and interceptors in ground silos in Poland:

"Well, let me say that, unfortunately I think we’ve had a feckless number of actors for the last four or five years, and not enough attention on how critical it is to have prevented Iran from getting as close as they now apparently are [to building a nuclear weapon].

"Every day that that they take a step toward having a nuclear weapon is one where we find ourselves in increasing danger.

"There are a number of things — President-elect Obama has made clear that engagement with Iran is important. In my mind, the most important player is Russia. We have a turbulent relationship with Russia as we speak. But we need to do a number of things with them, including negotiating an extension to the START treaty. But we need Russia specifically to help us with Iran. And obviously we’ve had European interlocutors who have worked hard but have not gotten past low, because the truth is that the Iranians don’t want to talk to them, they won’t talk to us. So, at some level, we have to — need to begin engagement. We need to strengthen the entire toolbox for nonproliferation. …

"One of the most important things that I didn’t talk about that we need to do is a closed nuclear fuel cycle. We need fuel banking. We need to have a way to deal with — I’m going to be at the IAEA meeting with [IAEA Director General Mohamed] ElBaradei in September on my way back from Pakistan — the most dangerous place in the world — and Afghanistan. And I will tell you that they don’t have enough money. The IAEA has been underfunded chronically. So we need to look at an across-the-board examination of our investment strategy, these international regimes, are these treaties really strong enough? "Can we have a nonproliferation treaty that has well-known outliers out there? I say no. "Now, I don’t know how you convince the ones that we clearly know about — India, Pakistan and Israel — to come in. [While India and Pakistan admit they have nuclear weapons, Israel never has made such an announcement.] I say, you know, if they don’t want to come in, we move the fence and put the fence around them. I think there has to be a very big conversation in this country and around the world, and we have to say, to countries and leaderships, and publics and parliaments, if you have nuclear weapons, you cannot have them. The world will not stand idly by and let you have them, unless you are under a regime of inspections, IAEA controls, and … treaties — that you will not test and do lots of other things that we consider to be extremely irresponsible.

"The demand for nuclear power in the world has jumped exponentially, as you can imagine. Do we want those countries to begin to have cheap and inexpensive electricity? Absolutely. Can we afford to let some of these countries that are under very weak governments that can’t control their own borders, that can’t control what’s going on [in] their own countries, to have the ability to enrich [nuclear materials]? Absolutely not.

"So how do we find a way to make sure that one can happen without the other happening? And so we need a concentrated effort. People have got to have a laser-like … stress on what are the key components here, and where are the danger points, and how do we make sure that while we’re allowing development of nuclear commercial power, that we don’t let people have the ability to enrich? And what are the components you need to have that? So I think it’s enormously complicated — but I think the Iranian issue is job one. It is certainly for President-elect Obama and his national security team.

"But part of what we have to do is gain the high ground by making sure people don’t understand that we’re talking out of both sides of our mouths. So we’re going to have to do things like … advance certification … and a number of other things, to make sure people believe we are good stewards of our own [nuclear weapons] stockpile, that we’re reducing it, at the same time that we’re making sure that people can have cheap electricity without … the ability to enrich."