In Seven Years Since Anthrax Attacks, Much Is Undone In Countering Biological Threat; Prevention, Response Needed

Multiplicity Of Sensor Systems Available, But No Decision Made On Which To Buy

Seven years after deadly anthrax attacks along the Eastern seaboard struck congressional offices, postal facilities, a New York TV network and more, the United States still has no program to prevent and/or respond fully and effectively to another biological terrorist attack.

And a proliferation of sensor systems to detect a bio terror attack once it occurs are helping to create indecision in selecting a system and deploying it.

These were some of the conclusions of experts who spoke at a forum of the Center for National Policy, a Washington think tank focusing on defense against future threats.

"Our country still is not prepared to cope with" effects of another biological terrorist attack, said Margaret A. Hamburg, a physician and senior scientist with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington think tank pressing for reducing threats of weapons of mass destruction.

"Another biological attack could occur at any time," Hamburg said, and it could strike down far more people than the 2001 attack that killed several victims.

A new and more lethal attack could "devastate whole cities and beyond," she said.

While the anthrax attacks caused fear in the general population, the anthrax involved wasn’t a communicable disease. "Attacks using communicable diseases are even more terrifying," she said.

Unlike a terrorist attack that would employ a nuclear weapon, she said, an assault involving biological weapons would be inexpensive, easily produced, and simple to transport or hide.

Pathogens to employ in a biological weapon can be found in nature, as well as in high-tech, high-security laboratories, she noted.

"We know that al Qaeda is working to obtain these weapons," including nuclear, chemical and biological devices, she added.

A wide range of biological agents could be used, including anthrax, smallpox, tularemia and botulism and its toxin.

"It is a frightening set of scenarios," she said, involving "a rapidly evolving set of concerns," such as recent research into how to change basic building blocks of life.

While science can produce much to benefit humans such as vaccines to prevent disease, science also can be used for ill by those with malicious intent, she observed. That said, however, she would oppose placing draconian limits on research, for there is far more potential for good than harm here.

In confronting the threat of biological attacks, she urged the United States to pursue prevention to avert attacks, to prepare adequate responses to attacks that do occur, to ensure disease surveillance to recognize when a pandemic has begun to occur, to establish ancillary sites for health care to relieve immense overcrowding of hospitals and other facilities that an attack would cause, to ship medicine where it would be needed to swiftly treat stricken victims, to provide public education about the disease or diseases involved, and to perform or back research on effective bio attack prevention.

Hamburg noted that terrorists would have a difficult challenge in topping disease pandemics that have occurred naturally, such as tens of millions of people killed by bubonic plague (the Black Death) in the 1340s, the Spanish flu in 1918, and the AIDS pandemic seen since the early 1980s.

Multiplying Sources Of Threat Agents

The number of civilian laboratories and pharmaceutical facilities possessing possibly lethal organisms has multiplied in recent years, according to Brian Finlay, senior associate with the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank working for peace and security.

For example, he noted that Botox and other brand-name treatments, which some people use to conceal signs of aging, contain botulinum toxin Type A, "one of the most dangerous substances known to man." One teaspoon of this toxin can kill scores of soldiers.

The toxin is produced by a bacterium, Clostridium botulinum. While cooking may kill the bacteria, it won’t remove the toxin, so that well-cooked foods still can be lethal. Further, the bacteria can live even in hermetically sealed containers such as cans of food.

German, Japanese, American and Soviet military forces have produced weapons utilizing botulinum toxin, he observed.

As more and more laboratories and companies in the United States and around the world possess and work with botulinum and other dangerous bacteria, risks rise that terrorists may obtain them to fashion weapons of mass destruction.

Ricin and other disease agents also could be used by terrorist organizations, he continued.

As more and more small- and medium-sized companies possess such organisms, "eventually something bad is going to happen," Finlay said.

One laboratory, he noted, was fined and given five years probation for shipping materials containing dangerous disease agents to Syria.

A drug containing botulinum toxin has been marketed in Iran, a terrorist state.

"We need to be certain who these companies are" that possess such materials, and ensure that they safeguard them, he said.

Space & Missile Defense Report asked Hamburg what disease incidence/mortality would occur if a biological weapon were delivered by ground vehicle or a cruise missile (no need to smuggle it through customs) from a ship in the Atlantic, and detonated on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., or in midtown Manhattan.

"There is no one answer," she said, because it would depend on factors such as the disease agent employed.

She also said delivery by missile would be unlikely, since that would be more complicated that a direct-release tactic from a vehicle. Both she and Finlay noted that a biological attack can be initiated outside the United States, for example by spreading an infection throughout an overseas airport that has many passengers flying to the United States.

Also, a biological attack could be mounted not on the human population, but on animals in the food chain, saying agricultural terrorism could become a genuine threat.

While some types of disease organisms employed might produce large numbers of fatalities, she said that isn’t necessary to produce terror in the populace. "You don’t necessarily need a lot of bodies to get the effect," she said, citing the relatively small number of fatalities in the anthrax attacks.

Anthrax isn’t communicable from human to human, but rather is contracted through contact with disease organisms, and it would produce fewer casualties than a communicable disease. For example, smallpox is a communicable viral disease, and could be spread by a purposely infected terrorist.

Space & Missile Defense Report asked Finlay how he assesses sensor systems that detect the presence of biological agents, and perhaps chemical and nuclear agents as well.

"We have spent a boatload of money" on such systems, he said.

Immediately after the attacks in 2001, members of Congress were besieged with defense contractors marketing sensor systems, he recalled.

And even now, "Congress is being barraged" with such proposals.

The multiplicity of systems, each with their own strong proponents, is a reason why there hasn’t been a coordinated response, he said. He termed it "a confused cacophony of competing demands."

"I couldn’t agree more," Hamburg said.

One such system works thusly:

Sensors are deployed at various sites throughout an area to be monitored.

The sensors are linked to a central unit housed in an aluminum suitcase.

Opening the suitcase reveals an electronic screen displaying a map of the area.

As sensors begin to detect the presence of a threat agent, the area on the map denoting where those sensors are deployed begins to turn red. As the contamination spreads, so too does the red area oozing across the screen.