In what has been described as an unprecedented event, the Orbital Sciences-built, Intelsat-owned-and-operated Galaxy 15 satellite stopped communicating with ground controllers April 5. But the satellite’s C-band payload remained operational and active, fully capable of retransmitting radio signals even as Intelsat moved its customers’ traffic to other satellites and Galaxy 15 commenced an uncontrolled drift eastward in geostationary orbit altitude.

That drift is taking Galaxy 15 from its 133 degrees West orbital slot towards the Lagrange, or libration, point at 105 degrees West, one of two points in geostationary orbit to which satellites tend to move and pool as a result of offsetting gravitational, centrifugal and centripetal forces (the other point is diametrically opposite at 75 degrees East). As Galaxy 15 drifts towards the libration point, in the way was SES’s AMC-11 C-band satellite at 131 degrees West. Galaxy 15’s operational C-band array interfered with AMC-11’s uplink and downlink traffic as it passed through the orbital slot (Galaxy 15 will pass through the orbital slots of other Intelsat satellites, and at some point is expected to lose its solar panel sun lock and power, becoming inert).

Galaxy 15 has been described as a “zombie satellite”— as are the many other out of service satellites haunting the Lagrange points — and has generated a lot of press, both because of the nature and ramifications of the anomaly and because absolutely no space journalist or analyst can resist the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to use the word zombie in an article. The ramifications are real, though, and likely will grow more prevalent.

By all accounts, Intelsat and SES cooperated effectively in addressing the situation, and in fact, no loss of signals to SES customers was reported as Galaxy 15 passed through AMC-11’s slot. However, the event highlights the growing problems of orbital overcrowding, interference and space debris in orbit — as did the February 2009 collision in low-Earth orbit (LEO) between an Iridium satellite and a defunct Russian military satellite, a collision also described as “unprecedented.” Intelsat and SES are perhaps the two operators best able to collaborate effectively in coping with the problem due to available backup capacity, experienced controllers and a customer base that can adapt to the changing conditions and use interference-reducing ground equipment. One level of subtlety down, Intelsat and SES are the two largest FSS operators and are companies of approximately equal revenue and fleet sizes. The question therefore arises as to what would happen if a similar situation occurred between operators of materially different sizes, backup capacities and other attributes. Can the currently displayed cooperative model be trusted to function as well in those cases?

Whether it can or not, it is time to rethink in-space repair and recovery capabilities. Satellite servicing plans have been part of the future-looking part of space conferences for years. Part of the Obama administration’s rationale for revamping NASA’s mission in its fiscal 2011 budget and subsequent policy pronouncements was to free NASA from the tyranny of astronaut-to-LEO ferry service and allow it to focus on more important and challenging missions. There is a NASA-worthy mission: a Hubble space telescope-like repair capability that would also allow industry, for a price, to bus their satellites when they are through using them.

Industry also can step up. Recently, MDA Corp. of Canada announced plans to explore an in-flight robotic satellite servicing capability. The company identified commercial, military/government and other rationales for investment in a robot that could rendezvous with a distressed satellite for refueling or repair services. Other companies also have explored the territory. Customer buy-in will be critical. Government and/or commercial operators will have to support such a program with strategic investments or long-term contracts to justify the developers’ initial investments, purchases of launch vehicles for test missions and other development costs. It is also a highly rational goal for government COTS-like subsidies to encourage private sector investment. It needs to be done. If not, interference, collision and debris problems will be exacerbated as time goes on.

Owen D. Kurtin is a founder and principal of private investment firm The Vinland Group LLC and a practising attorney in New York City. He may be reached by e-mail at [email protected].